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Jealousy, competition, or a contextual cue for reward?
Commentary on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy
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Abstract: Emotions are difficult to assess, even in humans. The attribution of jealousy in an animal
like a dog is especially difficult because performance of a particular behavior in the context of
another animal receiving a reward may not be easily distinguishable from intra-species
competition or simply a response to a contextual cue for the availability of reward. The authors
provide distinguishing evidence in the form of fMRI data to show that in the presence of a “fake”
dog being fed, there is bilateral activation in the amygdala, an area associated with anxiety, anger,
fear, and even jealousy in humans.
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Research on emotions in humans is difficult because the behavior demonstrated is not always
consistent with the feeling expressed verbally. Consider crying, an emotion often shown when a
missing child has been found. Finding a lost child should be a happy occasion, so one interprets
the emotion as happiness rather than sadness. At other times, one depends on the behavior as
an indication of an emotion that may be unconscious (e.g., snapping at one’s spouse several hours
after being criticized by one’s boss at work). Thus, one often uses context as a cue to evaluate the
underlying emotion because neither the behavior nor the subject’s self-described feeling is an
accurate measure. Research on animal emotion is considerably more problematic because one
cannot even ask the animal about its emotional state, nor would it be appropriate for us as
experimenters to interpret the behavioral context in terms of how we would feel under similar
circumstances. Instead, typically, we are left with the animal’s behavior and the context in which
it occurs as the only basis on which to assess the emotion.
Consider the following scenario: Two dogs are lying on the floor. One of them gets up and
nuzzles a human (perhaps a request for petting?). Immediately, the other dog gets up and does
the same. The human may judge this to be a sign that the second dog is jealous because the first
dog is receiving attention. Jealousy implies resentment, involving an unhappy or angry feeling.
But what is the second dog actually feeling? Could it be that the sight of the first dog getting
attention served as a cue to the second dog that attention is now available? Alternatively, the
sight of another dog getting attention may provoke not jealousy but competition in the second
dog. Competition does not typically involve anger. Of course, there may be behavioral cues to
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distinguish between attention availability and jealousy. For example, if the second dog growls at
the first dog, it would imply some level of hostility, a suggestion of jealousy. However, if the
second dog shows little interaction with the first dog, interpreting the second dog’s behavior as
responding to a cue for a time to get attention or to be competitive might be more parsimonious.
What would make this scenario more difficult to interpret would be if, in approaching the human,
the second dog nudges the first dog away from the human’s petting hand. Should the behavior
be interpreted as “I want some of that too”, “I need to compete with you to get that attention”,
or “I resent the fact that you are getting attention and I am not”? How can one get at the
underlying emotion of the animal, especially a pet who may have been trained not to behave in
an aggressive way?
Cook, Prichard, Spivack, and Berns (2018) suggest that brain imaging (fMRI) may provide
a clue. It should be noted that for those of us who do research with animals, the idea of obtaining
a brain scan from an awake, unrestrained dog would be a very difficult task, but Berns, Brooks,
and Spivack (2012) not only trained dogs to lie still under relatively unfamiliar, noisy conditions
but were quite successful in obtaining fMRI scans of dog brains. In their experiment, they
compared the brain scans of dogs observing a human feeding a “fake” but realistic-looking
appropriately-smelling dog with a control condition (the brain scan of the same dog observing the
human putting food into a bucket). Relative to the control condition, in the experimental
condition, they reported bilateral amygdala activation, that when found in humans suggests “a
range of affective states including anxiety, anger, fear, and even jealousy.” Furthermore, this
activation was positively correlated with the caregiver’s assessment of the temperament of the
dog (C-BARQ; Hsu & Serpell, 2003).
One may distinguish among the human emotions suggested by amygdala activation by
appealing to contextual cues or by asking the subject to introspect about the emotion (neither of
which may be accurate). Given these caveats, I find the authors’ use of the term proto-jealousy
to be sufficiently cautious to warrant the claim that something akin to human jealousy or envy
was the emotion that was experienced by the dogs in this study. I applaud the authors’ carefully
designed experiment and their carefully stated conclusion. I suspect that it will challenge other
researchers to use these procedures to further explore proto-emotions in animals.
A minor point: I would think that the context in which the dogs’ brain was scanned would
have been more suggestive of envy than jealousy. Envy may occur when one lacks a desired
attribute enjoyed by another, whereas jealousy may occur when something one already
possesses is threatened (Parrot & Smith, 1993).
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The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel
(not even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5
billion individual members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other
species on the planet (20 quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish, with which humans share biological and
cognitive ancestry, but not one other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their
human spokespersons — the comparative psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists
who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-reading" other species — will provide a sweeping panorama of what it
feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog, bat, chicken, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of
facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not only for our understanding of human cognition, but
for our treatment of other sentient species.
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